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Abstract
It has been long since French physician Jean-Baptiste Denys carried out the first successful blood
transfusion to a human being. Using bird feathers as canules, sheep blood was transfused to a young
man. The patient died soon after Denys' treatment and Denys was accused of murder. In the XXI
century, known as the biotechnology century, we face new challenges in Medicine. New emerging
and reemerging diseases, such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) or "mad cow disease" and its
human variant (vCJD), challenge the biosafety aspects of a widely extended and extremely useful
technique, that is, the perfusion of blood, of its derived components and of other pharmacological
products obtained from plasma. To face these new challenges we need innovative prevention
strategies.
For over 20 years, hemotherapy has aimed at achieving
the greatest safety in whole blood transfusions, blood
components, or plasma derivatives, because availability of
safe and reliable blood represents a crucial element for
medical progress and for public health prevention. Con-
cern arose at a time when approximately 1 out of every
100 blood units transmitted the human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV) or hepatitis C virus (HCV).
Since Denys's first transfusion [1] there have been
improvements in donor election and technological inno-
vation in terms of both donor selection and detection of
infectious agents using nucleic acid amplification proce-
dures. Nonetheless, attention should be held to prevent
future potential iatrogenic catastrophes, as it has been
estimated, for instance, that 1 out of every 2000 platelet
transfusions may contain infectious agents. Malaria and
dengue are becoming new public health risks that also
affect transfusion safety. Not so long ago, such infections
were associated to exotic and sporadic travels, so that they
were contained by keeping affected potential blood
donors under quarantine for several months.
The current situation is very different. There is an expo-
nentially increasing number of immigrants and emigrants
who travel worldwide in a few hours, and Trypanosoma
cruzi  can arrive in 50% of immigrants coming from
endemic areas. Moreover, in addition to Trypanosoma,
Babesia, Leishmania, Nile virus, avian flu virus, acute respira-
tory syndrome, or the Chikungunya virus may also be rapidly
transmitted. These emergent and re-emergent diseases
extremely jeopardize transfusion safety [2].
The reality is that, as stated by Zessin [3], we are facing a
livestock revolution and globalization, characterized by
an increasing animal and foodstuff free trade. Modern life
conditions are the result of globalization, which in many
cases determines the prevalence of certain factors respon-
sible for the so-called emergent diseases. Such factors may
include certain ecological changes, such as those due to
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agriculture or economical development or resulting from
climatic abnormalities, human demography or behavio-
ral changes; also travel, trade, technology and industry,
adaptation and changes in microorganisms, as well as a
general lack of public health measures. With regard to
pathogenic agents, a striking feature of emergent and re-
emergent diseases is the current increase in the diversity of
causative organisms, ranging from bacteria, rickettsias,
fungi, protozoa, and helminths to proteins (prions), and
including viruses.
Therefore, an epidemiological approach does not allow
for long-term prediction and prevention with regard to
the majority of new pathogens, but only provides a theo-
retical and coarse estimate of the risks for a given patho-
gen population. A minimum correlation between animal
production, diseases of an animal origin, and human dis-
eases requires reconsideration of concepts, methods, and
structures. This allows for the implementation of new
coordination measures in emergency situations which are
prompted by diseases crossing species barriers.
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has attracted
attention to a group of diseases affecting animals and
humans. Over time, these diseases have been given differ-
ent names, some of which, alluding to the still insuffi-
ciently known purported causative agent, were scarcely
rigorous from an academic viewpoint. Thus, reports spoke
of diseases caused by slow viruses, viroids, virions, or non-
conventional viruses and, more recently, of diseases
caused by prions [4,5].
Thirty years ago, the most widely known condition, Creut-
zfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), was a rare form of dementia
unknown to many physicians. The name is now familiar
because in 1996 bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), widely known as "mad cow" disease, appeared. The
potential association of the new human variant of Creut-
zfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) to BSE attracted the attention
of health authorities, healthcare professionals, and the
general population to this rare disease. Moreover, the pos-
sibility that there maybe a risk of transmission of vCJD
through transfusions of blood and its derivatives has
caused some social concern.
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are
caused by infections agents, but may also occur as genetic
or sporadic diseases. They are so called due to their main
characteristics: spongiosis of the brain and transmissibil-
ity. Humans may experience Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(CJD) in its sporadic, iatrogenic, and familiar forms; kuru;
Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinke (GSS) encephalopathy;
fatal familial insomnia (sporadic or familial) (FFI/SFI),
and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), which only
affects humans.
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) affects the brain, induc-
ing its total neuronal destructuration, sponge-like appear-
ance and complete loss of nerve function [6]. CJD is a
degenerative disease with a fatal prognosis and an overall
prevalence of approximately one in one million habit-
ants. CJD may be sporadic (idiopathic), hereditary, or
acquired. Sporadic CJD accounts for 80%–90% of cases
worldwide. CJD is a transmissible neurological condition
occurring mainly as the result of dura mater or corneal
implants or treatments with growth hormone of a pitui-
tary origin. The causative agent is a protein called "prion"
(PrP). While hereditary and infectious cases have been
documented accurately, in most reported cases the reason
for prion occurrence is unknown. Typically, this leads to
neurological symptoms affecting movement, as well as
extreme drowsiness and clumsiness. In its severest grades,
the disease may be associated to psychiatric symptoms,
including a severe dementia state.
While in recent years much research has been done on the
biochemical and replication aspects of prions, there is still
much to be learned about the molecular mechanisms
leading to nervous system neurodegeneration. However,
it is highly possible that the cell biogenesis mechanisms of
these proteins that control intracellular "traffic", folding,
or extracellular targeting, are impaired [7]. The recent
hypothesis that prion infection may require close contact
between a given tissue, such as muscle, and infected neu-
rons or nerve endings is also being tested [8]. Equally, it is
not known whether a small amount of prion may be
determinant to suffer the disease, though one may intui-
tively think that, as for any infection, occurrence of this
disease may be dose-dependent or depend on other co-
factors [9].
Three types of CJD have been reported to date: (i) spo-
radic or spontaneous, the most common type, accounting
for 85% of all cases; (ii) familial or hereditary, involving a
genetic component. A point mutation in the gene encod-
ing for prior protein causes a defective folding of the pro-
tein, which precipitates and destructures the brain; and
(iii) iatrogenic, when prions are acquired through the
ingestion of meat or meat derivatives from affected ani-
mals, from transplants, or through the administration of
blood or blood derivatives containing prions from
humans with the disease or without any symptoms.
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) is the human
form of "mad cow disease". Its causative agents are infec-
tious proteins called prions, which are not inactivated by
standard antiviral methods [10]. These new infectiousInternational Archives of Medicine 2008, 1:9 http://www.intarchmed.com/content/1/1/9
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agents are transmitted through the blood stream since
they are adhered to the outer membrane of lymphocytes.
In addition, due to their very small size, prions are barely
retained by conventional sterilization filters. Moreover,
they are proteins physiologically, rather than pathologi-
cally, present in the body with their normal structure. For
this reason, they are not recognized as foreign by the body
because their antigenic regions remain unchanged. Thus,
an effective immunological rejection response is not
mounted. The window or symptom-free period of this dis-
ease may be very long, up to 40 years, as shown by the fact
that some children who received growth hormones
extracted from pituitary glands of cadavers in the 60s are
now developing vCJD. Consequently, due to the current
unavailability of an in vitro test for detecting prions in
blood, it is difficult to manage problems in terms of dona-
tion quality. Diagnosis may only be established on nerve
tissue biopsies or post mortem biopsies.
Following the above, a blood donor may be in the asymp-
tomatic period of the disease and be unaware of its pres-
ence. From the viewpoint of public health, such
possibility, combined with the unavailability of screening
tests for donors, turns these volunteers into high risk
donors. Moreover, no curative treatment currently exists
for the disease, so that a fatal outcome is to be expected. A
prolongation of the disease's incubation time when prion
accumulation in the brain is reduced by administering
pentosan polysulphate by the intraventricular route has
only been reported [11].
The normal form of the prion (PrPc), whose function is
unknown, is located in the brain and other body regions
in humans and many animals. The abnormal prion pro-
tein, or PrPsc, is chemically identical to the normal form,
but has a different spatial conformation that makes it
resistant to normal degradation processes in the cell. Fur-
thermore, it induces its accumulation in several tissues,
particularly in the central nervous system, where the most
severe damage occurs [12]. Prions are also transmitted
through the blood stream [13]. Disease progress is charac-
terized by a neuronal tissue loss that causes a typical
sponge-like appearance of the brain. A significant fact is
the lack of a perceptible response of the immune system
against the abnormal prion, despite its different spatial
conformation. On the other hand, the abnormal prion
protein is resistant to most methods used to inactivate
bacteria and viruses. As a consequence, prions are not
totally inactivated by heat, ultraviolet light, or other
standard sterilization procedures, such as sodium
hypochlorite at the usual concentrations. Simple auto-
claving (a single cycle) is not sufficient to denature the
abnormal prion protein present in surgical instruments.
The initial abnormal prion protein may occur spontane-
ously (a possible explanation for sporadic CJD), be linked
to an inherited genetic abnormality in the PrP gene
(familial CJD), or be acquired through biological material
from infected people or plasma derivatives (iatrogenic
CJD). It should be noted that a major proportion of
patients with sporadic CJD and vCJD have the codon 129
polymorphism (methionine/methionine), a conditioning
genetic factor [14]. This genotype, occurring in 40% of the
general population, probably predisposes the conversion
of normal prions into abnormal prions which are associ-
ated to the disease.
In cases where the disease is developed, a conformation
change occurs within prions, so that prion proteins accu-
mulate in neuron cells. This alters neuronal function, and
ultimately leads to brain tissue vacuolization.
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)
The first case of BSE in humans was diagnosed in 1994,
ten years after the disease appeared in cows. In 1996, a
new disease related to BSE, defined as a variant of CJD
(vCJD), was first reported. Based on spatial and temporal
coincidence, this condition was considered to possibly
result from beef consumption, contrary to the idea that
animal BSEs did not affect humans. In recent years, mul-
tiple experimental evidences have shown vCJD to be the
manifestation of BSE in humans through what is already
known as "a jump across interspecies barriers".
In 1992, the number of BSE cases peaked (to approxi-
mately 200,000 cows), and decreased to a minimum in
1998, leading to an epidemiological cascade of vCJD in
humans due to the consumption of contaminated beef
products. This was not limited to the United Kingdom, as
cases have emerged in other countries due to the imports
of sick animals or dietary supplements such as meat
flours.
vCJD appears to be a disease with unique clinical and
pathological characteristics, clearly different from those of
classical or sporadic CJD. vCJD occurs in younger adults
and develops more slowly over 14 months, as compared
to the 4 months for classical CJD. Classical CJD occurs
worldwide with an incidence rate of 1 case per million
habitants yearly, while virtually all cases of vCJD have
occurred to date in the United Kingdom. Classical CJD
causes a rapid progression onto dementia or ataxia, while
vCJD occurs as a psychiatric disease, with or without sen-
sitive symptoms, that slowly evolves to the severe neuro-
logical stage. The final stages of both diseases are very
similar [15].
Since the first case of vCJD, the following cases have been
reported: 163 cases in the United Kingdom, 23 in France,International Archives of Medicine 2008, 1:9 http://www.intarchmed.com/content/1/1/9
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4 in Ireland, 3 in the United States, 3 in Spain, 2 in the
Netherlands, 2 in Portugal, 1 in Italy, 1 in Canada, 1 in
Saudi Arabia and 1 in Japan [16].
Coagulation plasma factors and variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the treatment of 
hemophilia
In the 70s, hemophilia started to be treated with factors
VIII or IX concentrates from human plasma fractionation.
Subsequently, around the 90s, the first recombinant fac-
tors by genetic engineering and molecular biology were
marketed. These were obtained from certain mammalian
cells, conveniently modified with the corresponding fac-
tor VIII or factor IX genes.
From a pharmacological safety viewpoint, there are clear
differences in the history of plasma and recombinant fac-
tors. Thus, only 11 years after plasma factors were firstly
used, these had already triggered the great iatrogenic pan-
demic by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). A lit-
tle later, in the 90s, the plasma factors caused infection by
the then mistakenly called non-A, non-B hepatitis virus,
which is currently known as hepatitis C virus (HCV). Both
infections have caused thousands of deaths in hemophil-
iacs, decimating by more than a half the worldwide pop-
ulation of hemophiliac patients. Though these two types
of viruses are inactivated in plasma concentrates, it is
expected that they will cause many more deaths in the
short and long term. This is due to the resistance to
antiretroviral drugs and their cumulative adverse effects
(mainly renal or pancreatic failure, or myocardial infarc-
tion because of increased cholesterol levels in relatively
young patients), and because of liver cirrhosis develop-
ment and hepatocarcinoma in 60% of patients not
responding to current treatments for HCV.
In contrast to this tragic record of plasma products, recom-
binant factors offered hope and assurance for treating
hemophilia but, above all, a safety that has been attested
by the absence of any mild or severe adverse event, either
infectious or of any other type, in the 18 years of use of
these products for the treatment of hemophilia.
Since the final 80s, it was thought that the history of
plasma factors could be changed by inactivating viruses
with heat, and subsequently by dual inactivation methods
at high temperatures as well as with solvents-detergents.
However, this did not succeed. New threats have arisen
and will arise with the so-called emergent diseases,
prompted by the extraordinary demographic migration of
humans, who can even cross interspecies barriers from
animals to humans. This has caused plasma factors, which
were and are very safe against viruses with a lipid envelope
such as HIV and HCV, to become once more vulnerable to
new infectious agents such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
Between 1997 and 2000, the United Kingdom National
Blood Service and Health Protection Agency [17] reported
the existence of blood donors who had developed vCJD
after blood donation.
Since the initial emergence of vCJD in the United King-
dom, there was speculation about the theoretical risk of its
transmission through blood and blood derivatives. While
epidemiological evidence did not suggest that the spo-
radic form could be transmitted through blood, it was rec-
ognized that the new CJD variant could be potentially
transmitted by such route because of its characteristics, as
compared to the classical form, particularly with regard to
involvement of the lymphoreticular system. This hypoth-
esis took ground later, in December 2003, when conta-
gion via a transfusion of packed red cells was confirmed in
a patient. A second case sufaced in July 2004, followed by
a third case in 2006 and by the most recent case in January
2007.
Concern arose in other countries, such as Spain, where the
first case of vCJD in a female patient was reported in 2005.
This case would have passed unnoticed had it not been for
the fact that the woman, who died from the disease, had
been a blood donor for several years. Her blood was used
for plasma fractionation and for obtaining immunoglob-
ulins, platelets and red blood cell concentrates, as well as
concentrates of plasma factor VIII to treat hemophilia A.
The Spanish pharmaceutical company that prepared this
factor did not raise an alarm or, if it did, ensured that there
was no risk of vCJD. All factor VIII batches prepared from
plasma contaminated by prions were administered in
their entirety to 300 hemophiliac patients.
Risk of infection and development of the variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease through blood and 
plasma derivatives
Using animal models, it has been experimentally shown
that prions are present in blood and are transmitted by
this route [12,13]. In addition, white blood cells —which
may be found in packed red cells and other blood compo-
nents for transfusion use— have aninfectivity similar to
plasma [18]. Therefore, there is a risk through surgical
instruments, transplants, blood transfusions, or treatment
with products derived from contaminated plasma.
According to Farrugia [19], the risk parameters include
essentially: (i) number of donations; (ii) proportion of
blood donors infected by vCJD;(iii) plasma volume per
donation; (iv) number of infective vCJD units per mL of
plasma; (v) number of product units prepared in the pro-
duction process; (vi) logarithmic reduction in the number
of infective units during the production process; and (vi)
amount of product used by the patient. To summarize, the
potential low infection risk of such concentrates is par-International Archives of Medicine 2008, 1:9 http://www.intarchmed.com/content/1/1/9
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tially due to two factors, namely the dilution of a contam-
inated donation with thousands of "clean" donations in
the same plasma batch, and the manufacturing process
itself, provided this includes steps that remove the infec-
tious agent such as leukodepletion, selective precipitation,
nanofiltration, and ion exchange chromatography.
No data quantifying the risk of infection through plasma
products may be provided due to the lack of a wealth of
information about pathogenic agents that cause the dis-
ease. However, risk estimations may be drawn based on
highly complex theoretical epidemiological models.
Therefore, such estimations will only serve as a guide for
taking the necessary public health precautions for pre-
venting any potential transmission of vCJD, or for imple-
menting the clinical and rational monitoring of patients
who have received prion-contaminated products.
It is believed that when plasma derived products from
donors who subsequently developed vCJD has been
received, the risks are high. In the autumn of 2003, the
consulting company Det Norske Veritas (DNV) performed
a risk estimation of prion infection when plasma factors
are used [20]. The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory
Committee (SEAC), the Committee on the Microbiologi-
cal Safety of Blood and Tissues, and the Committee on
Safety of Medicines accepted the risk data, and currently it
continues to be regarded as the only reference data [19].
Despite effective inactivation methods used for plasma
factors, it cannot be currently stated that these products
are totally safe, as they are always prepared from thou-
sands of blood donors and emergent diseases cannot be
controlled under these circumstances. Today, plasma fac-
tors are only safe against viruses having a lipid envelope,
because these viruses are sensitive to procedures using sol-
vent-detergent and heat. This is not the case for viruses not
having a lipid envelope, such as hepatitis A virus (HAV) or
parvovirus B19, or other emergent similar viruses which
may emerge. Indeed, current viral inactivation procedures
are not effective for prions that are resistant to all these
methods. By contrast, such circumstances do not take
place with factors of recombinant origin.
While risk estimation varies depending on prion clearance
steps during plasma fractionation and on the different
authors and the different methods used to prepare blood
derivatives [21-24], factor VIII and factor IX concentrates
obtained from cryoprecipitates and cryosupernatants
respectively are considered to involve a middle to high
risk for vCJD if plasma was contaminated by prions. It is
understood that the albumin used as stabilizer for recom-
binant factor VIII concentrates involves a low risk.
The risk is low if clearance or risk reduction steps used
during the concentrate preparation process and which
attenuate prion levels are considered. It is known that the
time or symptom-free period before the first symptoms of
the disease occur may be very long, up to 10 or 20 years,
and also that vCJD is actually transmitted through blood,
as shown in animal models. Alternative measures consist-
ing of treatments not involving use of plasma-derived
products, such as recombinant products, must therefore
be used, at least until the intimate mechanisms —prion
levels, transmission routes— are known and the reliability
of prion clearance procedures is established. A test for
detecting prions in blood in order to rule out blood
donors who are vCJD carriers would be determinant.
What is clear, and this is no novelty in medicine, is that
risks exist, and in no case could they be assumed to be
non-existent.
However, it should be noted that no case of vCJD has
been reported to date in hemophiliacs who have received
concentrates from plasma containing prions. Nonethe-
less, in medicine the absence of evidence does not repre-
sent an evidence of absence [25]. Equally, the possibility
that some cases have been overlooked because of the cur-
rent inadequate understanding of the disease and the una-
vailability of an adequate diagnostic method should not
be dismissed.
It is still very difficult to conclude on the possibility of
developing vCJD following a prion infection because
there are no adequate statistical data to risk predictions
and no molecular bases are available to establish etio-
pathogenetic mechanisms.
Prevention measures
Using data collected from a variety of animal species in
experimental models, the World Health Organization pre-
pared prevention measures from the classification of the
grades of infectivity of organs, tissues, and fluids.
In principle, general measures for any type of infection
must be taken, such as advising the general public against
the consumption of meat or products derived from
infected animals. In any good clinical practice, measures
appropriate directed to "biosafety" should also be taken,
including the decontamination of surgical materials in
general and of dentistry materials in particular. Whenever
possible, disposable materials should be used and in spite
of their higher costs innovative prion inactivation proce-
dures should be implemented [26-29].
Based on current knowledge about spongiform encepha-
lopathies, there is no evidence of a transmission risk from
regular close contact through the skin, saliva, or inter-
course. Nonetheless, for public health reasons it is advisa-International Archives of Medicine 2008, 1:9 http://www.intarchmed.com/content/1/1/9
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ble to avoid close contacts or ovule or sperm donation in
prion infected patients.
Despite the above and from the epidemiological view-
point of an infectious disease, the most appropriate action
is to implement or develop strict pharmacovigilance
measures, in this case hemovigilance measures [30,31],
that will include the detection, classification, and analysis
of the adverse effects of transfusions of blood or its deriv-
atives. In this way, their causes may be corrected and their
recurrence may be prevented. In this respect, the European
Parliament Directive 2002/98/EC [32] included in its
chapter V the obligation of all Member States to take any
actions required to guarantee the traceability from donor
to receptor and vice versa, as well as to report any serious
adverse effects and reactions related to the drawing, verifi-
cation, treatment, storage, and distribution of blood and
blood components which may influence their quality and
safety. Any serious adverse reactions that may occur dur-
ing or after a transfusion and that may be attributed to the
quality and safety of blood and its components should
also be reported.
In order to achieve the above objectives, it is essential to
follow-up both blood donors, potential asymptomatic
vCJD patients, and patients who have received blood con-
taminated by prions. This could be either as whole blood,
plasma, or derivatives, and blood components such as
packed red cells or platelets, but mainly concentrates of
coagulation factors, as these products have a very high
concentration of proteins that may include prions.
As regards blood, the requirements of traceability and
reporting of serious adverse reactions and effects of blood
and blood components must be considered, together with
reliable clinical practice and optimum donor selection,
leukodepletion —or white blood cell removal from
blood—, registration of blood donors, and information to
receptors of blood or its derivatives [33-35]. People who
have lived for more than one cumulative year in the
United Kingdom —England, Scotland, Wales, Northern
Ireland, Isle of Man, and Channel Islands— during the
period from 1980 to 1996, both inclusive, can be
excluded as risk donors. Universal blood leukodepletion
is required [36] because it has been clearly shown that
prion levels are very high in the lymphoreticular system
[37], and the use of other procedures to remove prions
from blood derivatives, such as several heating cycles,
nanofiltration, and ion exchange chromatography should
be urged [38].
Current and future alternatives for maximum 
prevention
There are three main axioms regarding blood: first, blood
will always be a scarce good that will have to be donated;
secondly, there is no zero risk for a blood receptor; and
thirdly, since blood is a biological product, it will never be
totally free from contamination by currently known
viruses, bacteria, or prions or by other still unknown
agents. In such circumstances, and since blood will con-
tinue to be required, an immediate objective is to try and
administer the so-called "red blood" at hospitals in the
safest and most adequate way [39]. It should also be
noted that while emergent diseases represent a real and
very current concern, blood donation is an inevitable fact
because of the low offer of donations and the great
demand for blood and its derivatives [40].
These reasons, simple and complex at once, suggest a
number of actions to ensure the safety of blood and its
derivatives. First, this involves the implementation of
measures aimed at donor selection based on epidemio-
logical and demographic factors related to given diseases
and on serologic tests negative for different infections pos-
sibly detectable in blood. Secondly, drugs that are not
derived from plasma should be used, such as recombinant
products, which have not caused side effects after almost
25 years of use and therefore have become a highly effec-
tive and safe therapeutic alternative [41]. In this sense,
many countries are implementing health policies aimed
at recommending and encouraging the use of recom-
binant medicines, provided that they are not contraindi-
cated and that such use is permitted by social and
economic factors.
On the other hand, international consensus has been
reached about the different alternatives to allogeneic
blood transfusion [42]. Actual examples of such alterna-
tives include the administration of activated recombinant
factor VII, particularly useful for decreasing bleeding and/
or transfusion requirements in various medical or surgical
procedures where uncontrolled massive bleeding occurs
with conventional methods. Another example is aprotinin,
a dose-dependent antifibrinolytic that inhibits trypsin,
plasmin, and plasma and tissue kallikrein. Furthermore,
desmopressin increases platelet adhesion —by increasing
expression of the platelet GPIb receptor— and plasma lev-
els of factor VIII and von Willebrand factor from its pro-
duction sites in the endothelial cells of hepatic sinusoid.
Equally, recombinant erythropoietin stimulates erythropoi-
esis by inhibiting apoptosis of erythroid precursors and
promotes proliferation and maturation into erythrocytes.
Finally, perfluorocarbons is useful for intravascular volume
replacement, and to fix gases such as O2; and perioperative
recovery of autologous blood to be returned to the patient as
packed red cells in saline.
In addition, pharmaceutical companies are fighting a bat-
tle against the clock to find a blood substitute —"artificial
blood"— using biotechnological procedures. The so-International Archives of Medicine 2008, 1:9 http://www.intarchmed.com/content/1/1/9
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called "masked" red blood cells and fluorocarbon com-
pounds are examples of future substitutes for red blood
cells carrying oxygen into tissue. In turn, fragments of
platelets conjugated with serum albumin represent a
future possibility for dispensing with platelet infusion in
cases of thrombocytopenia [43]. More recently, polyhe-
moglobins conjugated to antioxidant enzymes, coated by
lipid membranes, have opened up a new perspective for
the future [44].
Final conclusion
The history of medicine has undoubtedly shown that a
zero risk does not exist in any medical practice. Therefore,
the greatest possible number of public health precautions
should be taken even if statistics suggest that there are
minimum risks, as it happened in 1979 for AIDS and may
occur today for vCJD. A posteriori, those predictions have
been shown to be clearly wrong, and HIV has infected
approximately 65 million people, of whom more than 25
millions have died from AIDS [45].
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